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THE SIREN SONG OF HISTORY:  
ORIGINALISM AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
Reviewed by Jeffrey Shulman 
THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE.  Edited by 
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Mark David Hall and Jeffrey H. Morrison.  Foreword 
by Mark A. Noll.  University of Notre Dame Press 2009.  Pp. 316.  ISBN: 
0-268-02602-5; 
CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT.  By Donald L. Drakeman.  
Cambridge University Press 2010.  Pp. 371.  ISBN: 0-521-11918-9; 
GOD AND THE FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON.  By 
Vincent Phillip Muñoz.  Cambridge University Press 2009.  Pp. 242.  
ISBN: 0-521-51515-7. 
Happy people have no history. 
Leo Tolstoy 
(quoting a French proverb) 
It is said that we are all originalists now.  No doubt some of us are 
more faint-hearted than others, but originalism has blossomed into so 
many versions of its original self that there is room for everyone at the 
party.1  The attraction of originalist scholarship to legal professionals—
law professors and jurists alike—raises especially interesting questions.  
While a few legal professionals are historical scholars of a high order, 
most are content to be second-hand historians, their scholarship 
borrowed to serve other academic interests or the demands of legal 
advocacy.  Donald Drakeman observes that the work of the Supreme 
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Court has been based often on “widely read and highly regarded 
histories [written by scholars] whose craft had not yet developed the 
dedication to nuance, to cultural frame of reference, or to the degree of 
objectivity expected of historians seeking tenure in twenty-first-century 
academia.” (147)  No doubt, this observation is true enough, and 
nowhere more so than when the Court has been faced with questions of 
religious freedom; but it suggests that a sophisticated historical 
scholarship will help legal professionals reach a more reliable 
understanding of the original meaning of the Religion Clauses.  Alas, 
historical reliability is not likely to be of much value to the legal 
professional.  
Indeed, there is an almost certain guarantee that the muse of history 
is not going to help those who want the Religion Clauses to stand for 
something determinate, at least for something determinate enough to 
serve a heuristic purpose in legal controversy.2  Dedication to nuance (a 
word, by the way, etymologically related to shadows and obscurity) will 
be little appreciated by those who assume that Clio promises her suitors 
a clear jurisprudential pathway.  The works reviewed here remind us that 
history is a fickle hermeneutical mistress; she may appear charming in 
her simplicity, but, in fact, she is a most complex and unreliable 
creature, rarely a firm foundation for legal argument or doctrine-
building.  What did the Religion Clauses mean to the eighteenth 
century?  Most likely as many things as they mean to us today.  
The collection of brief biographical essays that compose The 
Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life reminds us that “it is 
artificial to limit „the founders‟ to a few individuals.” (x)  More 
specifically, the essays are meant to “make a difference in helping 
Americans in the twenty-first century understand the complex role of 
religion in our nation‟s first years.” (xi)  The “vital role [religion played] 
in the American founding project” is complex in a way that an 
overemphasis on a relatively few founders cannot capture. (xiii)  What 
the collection is not meant to be is a polemical effort to ballast the 
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historical record by describing the views of the religiously inclined 
forgotten founders.  To make this point, Mark Noll points to “the 
complexity of what the authors achieve”: 
By broadening the notion of “the founders,” they draw in 
individuals who promoted a quite different kind of deism (Thomas 
Paine, author of the decisive piece of propaganda, Common 
Sense), or who adhered to a quirky individual religion (the 
Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush), or who maintained a 
moderate Anglican position (the Virginia jurist and first U.S. 
Attorney General, Edmund Randolph).  The historical payoff from 
studying a broad group of founders is to enrich rather than 
simplify our picture of what the founders “believed.” (x) 
It is true that a broadened notion of “the founders” achieves this 
complexity, but the volume‟s historical payoff would have been rich 
enough had the editors put aside the decisively different Paine, the 
theistic Hamilton, and the quirky Rush.  For the resulting picture 
would have provided a more coherent reminder of the compelling 
place that traditional religiosity occupied in the lives of many of the 
men and women who contributed mightily to our nation‟s ideological 
origins.  Even as the collection stands, it is hard not to see it as a 
polemical contribution, if a somewhat faint-hearted one, to the debate 
about the religious world of our founding fathers.  In fact, this 
contribution is the collection‟s real strength. 
One might question the editors‟ premise that “there has long been a 
tendency to discount or ignore the role of religion in the American 
founding in general.” (xiii)  Or, at least, whether this tendency has not 
been sufficiently corrected.  But assuming the premise to be true, these 
essays operate as a corrective to what the editors refer to as “religious 
illiteracy” among secular scholars. (xiv)  The strength of the collection 
lies not in its complexity, but in its effort to draw attention to a religious 
consensus that receives too little academic interest.  By providing a 
broader definition of “founder”—a definition that allows for the 
inclusion of Abigail Adams, Samuel Adams, Oliver Ellsworth, 
Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, John Jay, Thomas Paine, Edmund 
Randolph, Benjamin Rush, Roger Sherman, and Mercy Otis Warren—
and thus by providing a more complete picture of the founders‟ views, 
the collection hopes to bring to the historical foreground a set of themes 
that form a significant part of the country‟s foundational beliefs.  
What Edith Gelles says of Abigail Adams might be said of most of 
the figures we encounter in these essays: “Belief was like the air she 
breathed; it surrounded her and was taken for granted as a truth that 
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sustained life.” (30)  The commonplace-ness of deep religious belief 
perhaps has contributed to its being taken for granted in scholarly 
circles, and if all this collection did was to show that religion was 
important to the founders, forgotten and non-forgotten alike, it would be 
worthy of note.  But time and again more particular thematic notes 
resound through these biographies.  Above all, the lives discussed here 
(most of them, at any rate) testify to a prevailing providentialism.  All of 
life was considered providential to Abigail Adams.  “[N]othing occurred 
except by the will of God.” (31)  Such abiding trust in God‟s providence 
not only provided comfort and assurance in times of personal crisis (it 
was a time when sparrows fell with inconceivable frequency), but this 
same trust was the hallmark of the common political vision that America 
was the special object of divine solicitousness.  In our post-modern, 
post-colonial times, we may take such sentiments as little more than 
congratulatory imperial rhetoric.  For substance, we look to serious 
political theorists (even such “forgotten” ones as Vattel, Grotius, 
Sydney, Beccaria, or Pufendorf).  The point of this collection is that we 
pay insufficient attention to the substantive biblical and theological 
milieu within which many of the founders lived—and within which they 
waged revolution. 
The note of providentialism is heard in almost every entry.  For 
John Jay, the career of American independence and nation-building 
came about by the „great plan of Providence.‟” (146)  In this respect, 
America was thought of as special.  The new nation was uniquely 
committed to moral principles consistent with the divine plan, uniquely 
positioned to serve as an example of divine purpose.  Rosemarie Zagarri 
writes that Mercy Otis Warren “maintained that God had played a 
special role in enabling Americans to secure their freedom and establish 
the United States as a beacon of liberty to other nations in the world.” 
(285)  Similarly, Gary Smith describes how Samuel Adams expected 
“that God would „erect a mighty empire in America‟ characterized by 
biblical morality and manners and zealous efforts to spread liberty and 
Christianity to the world.” (50)  Indeed, rationalism and republicanism 
could co-exist with a fervid moral millenarianism, as in the case of 
Benjamin Rush.  By Rush‟s lights, as Robert Abzug tells us, “America, 
if it fulfilled its mission, would lead the world to the Second Coming 
prophesied by the Great Awakening.” (227-28)  The new order of the 
ages required a new republican virtue, even if that meant, for Rush, a 
system of education that was designed to “convert men into republican 
machines.” (232) 
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The linkage of liberty and Christianity, of religion and the republic, 
was the essence of a new American exceptionalism.  For God‟s 
protection of the new nation‟s freedom was tightly connected to moral 
concerns.  The providential vision was in part a legacy of the Puritan 
covenantal tradition.  God‟s blessing was not unconditional: His new 
kingdom on earth required a revolution in moral righteousness as well as 
in political rights.  From the font of providentialism flowed a sense of 
the critical importance of Christian virtue; from Puritanism, a sense of 
its fragility.  Rectitude, Samuel Adams argued, “would forever be „the 
Soul of a Republican Government.‟” (48-49)  And religion was the soul 
of rectitude.  Patrick Henry failed in his bid to obtain a general 
assessment to support religious teaching—and we have come to see 
Madison and Jefferson as the true progenitors of our religious 
freedom—but, as Thomas Buckley reminds us, Henry had excellent 
company in thinking that religion was the virtual ingredient of a virtuous 
society, both among non-forgotten founders (like Washington and 
Adams) and the probably forgotten (like Richard Henry Lee). (138-39)  
Righteousness alone, Henry wrote, can exalt a nation. (139)  Even 
Alexander Hamilton at his most deistic declared, as Gregg Frazer writes, 
that religion was one of the “venerable pillars that support the edifice of 
civilized society.” (114)  And when license replaced liberty, when 
religion and morality assumed separate posts, the blessings of divine 
providence would be withdrawn—and the hope of a Christian Sparta 
(this vision belonged to Samuel Adams (49)) would be lost.  “People 
were „not worth saving,‟” Adams wrote, “if they „lost their virtue.‟” (49)  
The irreligious French Revolution provided salutary notice of this 
possibility.  
This picture of religious consensus does more than flesh out the 
historical portrait of the founding times.  It should have an impact on 
contemporary political and legal debates.  At a broad level, as William 
Casto observes in his chapter on Oliver Ellsworth, it calls into question 
some of the basic operating assumptions of originalist historiography, at 
least where the Religion Clauses are concerned. 
[O]ne conclusion should be clear: justices and scholars who wish 
to understand the founders‟ views on religious liberty and church-
state relations should not limit themselves to particular founders 
whose views happen to support a particular twenty-first-century 
political agenda. . . .  James Madison and Oliver Ellsworth—both 
critical framers of the First Amendment—had significantly 
different views regarding the proper relationship between church 
and state.  Given this clear disparity, no one should pretend that 
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either man‟s carefully thought-out views represent those of the 
entire founding generation. (93-94) 
Mark Hall makes the same point in his chapter on Roger Sherman.  
Noting Sherman‟s belief “that Christianity was necessary for political 
prosperity,” (266) Hall concludes that as a matter of historical 
scholarship this view has not received its due. 
Sherman‟s approach to religious liberty and church-state relations 
may seem parochial today.  If, however, the founders‟ views are 
relevant for contemporary jurisprudence, then there is no good 
reason for preferring those of Thomas Jefferson . . . over 
Sherman‟s.  Moreover, an excellent argument can be made that 
Sherman is more representative of the founders with respect to 
these issues than Jefferson. (270) 
History records that though Jefferson offered moral support (with his 
famous letter proposing “a wall of separation of church and state”) to the 
Baptists who petitioned the Connecticut state legislature for greater 
disestablishment, it was Oliver Ellsworth‟s endorsement of state support 
for religious entities that prevailed.  Ellsworth was chair of the 
committee tasked by the Connecticut General Assembly with 
considering the separationist petition.  The committee‟s report, 
published under Ellsworth‟s sole signature, concluded that every 
member of society should support religious institutions for the secular 
good they do.  After all, religion is, as Ellsworth wrote, “wisely 
calculated to direct men to the performance of all the duties arising from 
their connection with each other, and to prevent or repress those evils 
which flow from unrestrained passion.” (74)  
These brief biographies challenge us to broaden our historical 
focus.  The real payoff in doing so comes from a greater familiarity with 
founders who espoused beliefs about church and state that were 
commonly held by members of the founding generation, views that 
ought to be a part of the great debate concerning the meaning of the 
Religion Clauses.  One can always quibble with the choice of figures 
selected for inclusion in such a volume,3 but I think this volume would 
have been stronger had it been more single-mindedly the historical 
ballast that it was not supposed to be.  To a large extent, this is the 
thematic thrust of The Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life, 
and to that extent it enriches our understanding of the role that religion 
played in the country‟s founding.  This role was also played by more 
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overtly religious forgotten voices, like that of the evangelical dissenter 
Isaac Backus.  Given the strict separationist views of religious 
nonconformists (working in the tradition of Roger Williams), the 
inclusion of a fitting representative would have gone a long way toward 
showing that even within the religious consensus of the eighteenth 
century there was complexity enough. 
Of course, Jefferson‟s wall would be constructed—and then 
deconstructed—by the Supreme Court.  In both efforts, the Court turned 
to the non-forgotten founders for support.  In his study of the process by 
which the Court created its high and impregnable wall, Donald 
Drakeman argues that “[t]o date, establishment clause jurisprudence 
clearly owes a considerable debt to Whiggish myth-making by a number 
of respected historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” 
(11-12)  An illuminating history of bad history, Church, State, and 
Original Intent is really two books in one: It is 1) a critique of the 
Supreme Court‟s early Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a critique 
that opens a fascinating historical window on how the Court succumbed 
to the temptations of law office history; and 2) an argument that, despite 
the opacity of the historical materials we have to work with, it is 
possible “to paint a reasonably clear picture of what was going on when 
the First Congress had its brief and desultory debate on the 
establishment clause.” (196)  Accordingly, Drakeman sets out to answer 
two questions critical to a proper understanding of the Establishment 
Clause:  
(1) Why did the Supreme Court pursue this quest for the First 
Amendment‟s original meaning, and once it did, where did the 
justices find the history they have so firmly grafted onto the text of 
the establishment clause?  (2) What is a reasonable originalistic 
interpretation of the establishment clause in light of all of the 
relevant materials? (vii)  
In response to the first question, Drakeman has produced a rich and 
engaging study of the uses of history made by the Supreme Court in the 
seminal cases of Reynolds v. United States (1879) and Everson v. Board 
of Education (1947).  Drakeman‟s second question (“What is a 
reasonable originalistic interpretation of the establishment clause . . .?”) 
already answers the work‟s most interesting theoretical quandary: Can 
the Supreme Court‟s opinions with regard to the Religion Clauses “flow 
naturally and unimpeded from the mandates of the historical record”? 
(148)  In other words, can history provide a clear path through the 
complexity?  Well, apparently, good history can.  
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Whether or not this is the right answer, it produces a work that 
effectively sidesteps a searching look at the premises of the originalist 
enterprise.  Drakeman spends a worthy chapter on “the explosion of 
scholarly literature” (148) that, in his words, has amounted to a battle for 
the historical high ground, a battle that has had no clear victor.  But he 
leaves relatively unaddressed the concern that the battle may be all for 
naught.  In other words, the net result of Drakeman‟s inquiry is that his 
history is the historical high ground.  It turns out that the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause is not historically indeterminate.  In fact, it turns 
out that the lack of historical clues to the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause is the clue we have been looking for all along.  
Drakeman provides a rich and engaging study of Reynolds and 
Everson.  In these cases, the Supreme Court “located the heart of the 
First Amendment‟s religion clauses in what we might now call the 
ardently strict separationist branch of the church-state debate.” (63)  
Drakeman‟s study of these cases is a fascinating exercise in intellectual 
archaeology, tracing the roots that doctrinal, and sometimes personal, 
biases took to arrive at a Virginia-centric reading of the Religion 
Clauses.  It was Chief Justice Morrison Waite‟s decision in Reynolds 
that “had the effect of essentially writing Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison directly into the First Amendment.” (21)  Drakeman traces the 
historical lineage from Justice Waite to George Bancroft, the preeminent 
nineteenth-century historian (and, perhaps equally important, neighbor 
to the chief justice).  Bancroft directed Waite to the Old Dominion, and 
the rest is, as they say, history: “Once directed to Virginia by Dr. 
Bancroft, the chief justice came under the direct influence of two native 
Virginian historians, Robert B. Semple and Robert R. Howison.  These 
historians shared the view that the Old Dominion was indeed the font of 
American freedoms.” (22)  
Drakeman is particularly sensitive to how easily history is infected 
by ideology of various stripes.  Semple and Howison “also happened to 
be Baptist and Presbyterian ministers whose ardent opposition to 
ecclesiastical establishments was inspired by the dissenting churches‟ 
persecution at the hands of a legally established church.” (22-23)  Thus, 
for these makers of history, as well as for the makers of law who relied 
on their research, the Jefferson-Madison historical legacy came to stand 
for a consensus on the principle of strict separationism, a principle 
culled from writings with a specific anti-establishment purpose 
(Madison‟s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments 
and Jefferson‟s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom).  Waite‟s task 
was to craft an opinion that both remained true to what Drakeman calls 
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these “odes to religious liberty” (63) and sustained Mr. Reynolds‟s 
conviction, against a religious freedom defense, under federal law 
outlawing plural marriages in the territories.  It is Drakeman‟s 
contention that Waite could have relied on other prominent sources “that 
not only would have amply supported the conclusion he needed to 
reach—that is, that the bigamy conviction be upheld—but, as raw 
material for future law office historians, could have taken the 
establishment clause in a very different direction.” (64)  It is not clear 
why Waite did not reach out to other commentators on the Constitution 
with which he was familiar, some of whom proffered the notion so 
prevalent in the biographies of the forgotten founders: that religion can 
and should receive encouragement from the state.  What is clear, to 
Drakeman, is that Waite‟s choice—the fact that Waite “fell under the 
influence of disestablishment historians whose fellow Baptists and 
Presbyterians, to gain political advantage in their battles against 
Virginia‟s establishment, embraced the bills of the „infidel‟ Jefferson 
and rescued Madison‟s Memorial and Remembrance from relative 
political obscurity” (72)—set the Supreme Court on a course toward 
strict separationist doctrine, a course that would evolve into “irresistible 
dogma.” (71)  In future Establishment Clause cases, the justices would 
choose among different readings of the Jefferson-Madison legacy, 
ignoring the competing legacy of a tribe of forgotten founders. 
Drakeman ultimately acquits Waite of writing law office history, 
resting what culpability there is for constructing history on a biased 
platform with the historians Waite consulted, who “took the church-state 
question down a somewhat more narrow path than it deserved.” (73)  He 
is less charitable with regard to the work of Justices Hugo Black and 
Wiley Rutledge in the Everson case.  Here, Drakeman contends, the 
justices quite consciously conflated historical mythmaking and 
constitutional doctrine-making.  Again, Drakeman provides a rewarding, 
if sometimes dispiriting, account of opinion-writing dynamics.  Again, 
Drakeman finds that history—specifically, the history of Virginia at its 
revolutionary and nation-building moments—became the stuff of 
“creation myth.” (82)  As Drakeman tells the story, “first Rutledge and 
then Black set off on a premeditated search-and-employ mission to 
locate historical events” that would serve their doctrinal purposes. (79-
80)  As in Reynolds, so in Everson professional historians aided and 
abetted the justices‟ efforts via a goal-oriented, Whiggish approach to 
historical interpretation. (80)  But it was not just that this history was 
infected with historiographical bias.  Drakeman makes the case—with 
appropriate caution—that the Court‟s first reading of the Establishment 
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Clause was influenced by the Protestant predispositions of the Court.  
The views of the justices and the historians they consulted 
reflected . . . mid-twentieth-century liberal intellectuals‟ fears of 
any form of authoritarianism, especially Roman Catholicism as 
“antagonistic to the „democratic way of life.‟” . . .  It is little 
wonder that in this cultural context Madison‟s and Jefferson‟s 
“strict separationist” writings would provide an appealing 
intellectual and constitutional pedigree for a Court anxious to 
protect critical democratic institutions, especially the schools, from 
the sectarian threat that could be unleashed by a breach in the wall 
of separation. (80-81) 
Nonetheless, Drakeman looks upon the Everson opinion with some 
compassion.  Today, he writes, it is easy to see the limitations of hyper-
Whiggish historical narrative and hagiographic biography.  Black and 
Rutledge, like Waite before them, could only work with the materials 
they had at hand, and what they had were widely read and highly 
regarded histories written by scholars whose craftsmanship had not yet 
reached the heights of today‟s paragons of nuance. (147-48)  (This is a 
bit of Whiggish metahistory, I suppose.  One wonders how future 
generations of historians will view the craft of today‟s practitioners.)  
But for years a cottage industry dedicated to the originalist craft has 
been setting the Establishment Clause record straight.  The fact that this 
mighty jousting between strict separationist and nonpreferentialist 
camps has more or less resulted in a draw, however, does not deter 
Drakeman from entering the fray. 
Part of the difficulty the historian of the Religion Clause faces is 
the nature of the evidence.  Drakeman goes beyond the non-forgotten 
founders to consider a wide range of historical materials, yet the 
historical background remains frustratingly murky.  It is Drakeman‟s 
trick to make clarity out of lack of clarity.  For Drakeman, the most 
striking and significant piece of evidence as to the original meaning of 
the Establishment Clause is the lack of historical evidence.  Had the 
Establishment Clause been meant to embody either a strict separationist 
or nonpreferentialist point of view, Drakeman argues, the hue and cry 
from the opposing camp would not have been missed.  We know what 
people were saying about the Establishment Clause at the time it was 
adopted and ratified—and, Drakeman claims, they were saying nothing.  
It is Holmes who best understands the meaning of this silence.  Not 
Oliver Wendell, but Sherlock Holmes.  The dog, you see, didn‟t bark.  
From the striking lack of commentary, let alone protest, on the part of 
those who were there at the creation, Drakeman concludes that the 
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Establishment Clause meant only that Congress should be prohibited 
from establishing a national religion.  The First Amendment succeeded 
“in turning the hotly contested subject of church-state relations—which 
had already caused legislative battles in the states and would continue to 
do so virtually in perpetuity—into a „milk and water‟ amendment by 
focusing on the one thing no one wanted and everyone could unite 
against: a „Church of the United States.‟” (260)  The clause was not 
meant to embody broad substantive values, (260-61) nor was it meant to 
shield state-level establishments from federal meddling. (329)  
Drakeman takes no position on whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Establishment Clause, but it hardly matters.  At the time 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Drakeman contends, the only shared 
meaning of the Establishment Clause remained that it “was designed to 
forbid a „national religion.‟” (321) 
With Vincent Muñoz‟s God and the Founders: Madison, 
Washington, and Jefferson, we return full bore to the non-forgotten 
founders.  But, as this work details, there is diversity enough in Muñoz‟s 
founding triumvirate.  Muñoz chooses not to enter the originalism fray 
directly.  Elsewhere, Muñoz has addressed the original meaning of the 
Religion Clauses;4 here, he is content to address the question indirectly, 
by providing a nuanced reading of the views held by three notable 
“fathers” of the Constitution.  Of course, as Muñoz notes, this project 
does have implications for originalist arguments.  Whatever flavor of 
originalism one ascribes to, the views of Madison, Washington, and 
Jefferson are important.  But Muñoz‟s contribution to the originalist 
debate is actually quite direct, if only implicitly so.  It is Muñoz‟s 
position that “none of these Founders embraced strict separationism or 
nonpreferentialism as those positions are typically understood.” (3)  
More to the point, Muñoz argues that Madison, Washington, and 
Jefferson—all advocates of religion as a natural right (6-7)—“disagreed 
about the separation of church and state and embraced different 
understandings of the right to religious liberty.” (3)  On such a ground, 
Muñoz might have been led to believe that a quest for the original 
meaning of the Religion Clauses is “both futile and misdirected.”5  
There may be multiple and contradictory original meanings.  There may 
                                                          
 4. Vincent Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from 
the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 1083 (2008); Vincent Muñoz, The Original 
Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 UNIV. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 585 (2006).  
 5. See Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 
45 MD. L. REV. 352, 375 (1986) (“[A] literal quest for the Framers‟ intent may be both futile and 
misdirected.”). 
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be an original meaning that is little more than an indecipherable 
compromise among original meanings.  
But historical indeterminancy is not the prevailing theme here.  
Whatever ambiguities are to be located within the history of the 
Establishment Clause, Muñoz sets out to determine the apparently 
unambiguous views of each founder not only on the broadest questions 
of religious liberty, but on the narrower point of specific church-state 
doctrinal controversies.  Muñoz‟s goal is threefold: 1) to describe the 
founders‟ “different understandings of the right to religious freedom”; 2) 
“to extrapolate legal doctrines from the church-state philosophies of 
each Founder”; and 3) “to explain how the Founders‟ different positions 
would have adjudicated actual cases that have come before the Supreme 
Court.” (8)  In short, Muñoz‟s project is to “set the historical record 
straight.” (3) 
In this regard, he opposes himself to originalists who presume “that 
each provision of the Constitution has one definitive original meaning 
and that that meaning should govern contemporary constitutional 
disputes.” (2)  Muñoz assumes, nonetheless, that there is one definitive 
original Madisonian or Washingtonian or Jeffersonian view of the 
Religion Clauses.  But which Madison are we talking about: the 
advocate of the Memorial and Remonstrance, the president who issued a 
prayer proclamation during the War of 1812, or the more detached 
Madison of the Detached Memoranda?  Which Washington?  Which 
Jefferson?  Even if we could draw a coherent picture of Madison‟s (or 
Washington‟s or Jefferson‟s) view of the Religion Clauses, how do we 
leap the chasm from theory to practice?  This is a project, if I may 
borrow from Stephen Smith, foreordained to failure.6  Perhaps “failure” 
is too strong.  We simply have no way of evaluating the conclusions 
reached by such a speculative and circuitous route.  However interesting 
the conclusions, they remain, in effect, the result of a mere thought 
experiment. 
In Muñoz‟s view, Madison emerges as a champion of a “religious 
blind” constitution, a constitution that prohibits the state from taking 
cognizance of religion, favorably or otherwise.  This is neither the 
Madison favored by the strict separationists nor the Madison preferred 
by the nonpreferentialists.  For Muñoz, Madison embraces what is 
essentially a church-state non-discrimination principle.  
 
                                                          
 6. See generally STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oxford Univ. Press 1995). 
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A Madisonian approach to the First Amendment, accordingly, 
would require the state to remain noncognizant of religion.  The 
government could not use religion as a basis for classifying 
citizens.  Religion as such could not be the cause of state action, be 
the subject of criminal sanctions or governmental regulations, or 
be used to determine eligibility for governmental benefits.  To 
borrow from contemporary civil rights discourse, the Madisonian 
position would require the state to remain “religion blind.” (121) 
A Madisonian approach to the First Amendment, Muñoz thus concludes, 
would not only allow indirect burdens that are the product of neutral and 
generally applicable laws, but “would prohibit all religiously based 
exemptions from such laws, whether by the judiciary or by ordinary 
legislation.” (179) 
While Madison wanted to create a governmental blueprint that 
would take no notice of religion, Washington sought “to use 
governmental authority to encourage religion and to foster the religious 
character of the American people.” (50)  For Washington, Muñoz writes, 
state support of religion was less about freedom of conscience than 
about civic stability and prosperity.  Washington‟s position was that 
“[g]overnment should support religion because religion supports 
republican government.” (59)  
It would be more accurate to say that Washington‟s position was 
that government should support religion when religion supports 
government, for Washington was prepared to encourage only those 
religious practices that were consistent with “the legitimate duties of 
republican citizenship.” (50)  If “a pious citizenry was indispensable to 
republican government,” (50) a zealous citizenry was all too likely to 
advocate behavior that, in Washington‟s view, would be contrary to 
good citizenship. (60-61)  Whatever Madison may have meant when he 
wrote that religious duty is precedent to the claims of civil society, 
Washington was not prepared to make civic responsibility secondary to 
other duties.  For Washington, Muñoz writes, “the obligations of good 
citizenship . . . stand as a precondition for one‟s rights to be secured.” 
(61)  Thus, because the state is under no affirmative obligation to 
tolerate actions opposed to good citizenship, the state “may legitimately 
expect all citizens to perform the reasonable duties of citizenship, even 
those that religious citizens find objectionable.” (60)  Under a 
Washingtonian approach to the First Amendment, religionists enjoy no 
right to exemptions from general law, and legislative accommodations 
ought to be limited by prudential concerns.  In Muñoz‟s assessment, 
“Washingtonianism would not prohibit or grant exemptions from 
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indirect burdens on religious practices as long as the state action 
burdening religion furthered a legitimate civic interest.” (179) 
Muñoz‟s chapter on Jefferson‟s view of religious liberty presents 
some especially interesting conclusions.  Noting the contradiction 
between Jefferson‟s professed philosophy of religious freedom as a 
natural right and his actual political practice (particularly, his opposition 
to clerical influences on social and educational policy), (72-73) Muñoz 
suggests that this tension can be explained as a feature of Jefferson‟s 
developmental or progressive view of religious freedom.  
Jefferson seems to have believed that different levels of religious 
freedom were appropriate for different stages of political and 
societal development.  He championed the idea that individuals 
possessed natural rights of religious freedom and that a just society 
should aspire to protect those rights.  At the same time, he did not 
believe that society could extend all the rights of religious freedom 
to religious clergy as long as clergy threatened the rights and 
freedoms of others.  The “establishment” of religious freedom, as 
Jefferson called it, first required freedom from clerical influence in 
American society and then, and only then, securing in practice the 
natural rights of religious liberty.  Jefferson‟s developmental view 
of religious freedom meant that the degree to which religious 
liberty could be protected depended on the level of rational 
development society had achieved. (73) 
As evidence of the “progressive nature of [Jefferson‟s] project,” 
(73) Muñoz moves from political philosophy to what we might call 
Jefferson‟s political pedagogy.  According to Muñoz, Jefferson‟s 
educational plan “reflect[s] his intention to move the religious views of 
the new nation away from ecclesiastical sectarianism toward a more 
generic nondenominationalism.” (110)  Education was one way to 
harness the power of the state in the interest of “nutur[ing] the rational 
religious beliefs that [Jefferson] believed supported reason and freedom 
and to suppress the irrational dogmas and institutions that he believed to 
be hostile to liberty.” (116)  That Jefferson‟s vision of civil liberties had 
its darker side is not a new observation,7 but Muñoz provides a useful 
reminder that one founder‟s enlightenment may well be another‟s 
religious Dark Age.  It is not surprising that a Jeffersonian approach to 
the Religion Clauses, in Muñoz‟s estimation, would favor religion the 
least. (189)  
                                                          
 7. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 
(Belknap Press 1963); David Tyack, Forming the National Character: Paradox in the 
Educational Thought of the Revolutionary Generation, 36 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 (1966). 
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*     *     * 
It is hard to foresee much happiness in the lot of those seeking the 
original meaning of the Religion Clauses.  We may acknowledge the 
opacity of the historical record, the variety of viewpoints held by 
founders forgotten and non-forgotten, the humanness of founders who 
did not always practice what they preached, even the basic 
indeterminancy of language; still, we are seduced by the siren song of 
interpretive certainty.  But the search for greater clarity is not without its 
payoff.  As the three books under review here illustrate, the more we 
look for answers in the historical record, the more we are likely to find 
ambiguity—and with each step we take away from the promised land of 
historical clarity, we move a step closer to the richer, if less certain, 
terrain of historical truth.  
